Reuters reported on "The EU has agreed
to 47% (average) punitive import tariffs imposed on Chinese solar panels"
further stimulus to the nerve of the PV industry in China, despite the Chinese
government requires negotiation attitude was overstating the company's share
price of PV, But it is no accident, following the United States last year
after an average of 35% punitive tariffs imposed on Chinese PV companies, as
the world's largest PV market in the European Union on Chinese PV companies
Lego threshold.
Questioned Europe and the United States trade protectionism among the most Chinese people would like to see, and the 1930 ultra-high tariffs led to the outbreak of World War II as an example criticized European and American practice dangerous and immoral, and Europe 700 Yu Jiaguang volt sales enterprise opposition based on its policy lobbying power of the enemy can not be more than 25 photovoltaic manufacturing industry alliance, the comprehensive trade protection can not happen, but the local industry policy adjustments shift the inevitable.
The rise in the European Photovoltaic Panels industry financial subsidies the Chinese PV companies can not continue to hopeEurope . In
fact, even the European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), also known as
the era of Europe's leading solar market may be coming to an end, the global
market share from 74% in 2011 down to 55% in 2012, which means that in 2012
year-on-year almost no growth of 31 gigawatts of the world's new solar
installations mainly from other markets, especially the new energy revolution
in the United States, after the earthquake in Japan. Not ahead of the
layout to adapt to global change of industrial structure and increase the added
value of industrial technology, is a major cause of unsustainable Suntech, LDK
and other Chinese PV leading enterprises.
Of course, long-term domestic energy policy constraints restricting the Chinese PV companies to expand the domestic market. Pattern of Guodian conventional electricity monopoly long-term constraints on the photovoltaic industry policy attitudes in recent years just changing industrial electricity significantly higher than the civilian electricity will be more conducive to the prosperity of the Chinese PV companies ushered in distributed generation policies. In recent years, due to the rapid decline of the cost of polysilicon, the cost of solar cell power inChina almost been reduced to half
of the industrial electricity prices. However, this distributed generation
is still subject to the Internet pricing system, as well as pre-investment
capacity constraints.
The financial structure of the high debt ratio is the reason many Chinese PV companies to defeat. The beginning of this century, 10 years of prosperity, the Chinese PV companies commonly used in the liability structure of the highly leveraged expansion, the photovoltaic industry long investment cycle, low return on investment (approximately 10-20%), "two out" the status of the Chinese PVdifficult for enterprises to effectively withstand the adjustment of the economic cycle.
In fact, the photovoltaic industry is not a special case of the Chinese model of economic development, but rather on behalf of the general growth of the Chinese economy. Industrial development deficiencies of its own capital accumulation can only continue to rely on external financing to meet its investment and market expansion, and subsequent investments can not follow up immediately into serious cash flow risk.
2008-2012,China 's
fixed asset investment up to a total of nearly 120 million yuan, up to more
than twice the GDP, which led to rapid growth in both corporate debt ratio and
government debt. 2011 corporate debt ratio up to 107%, warning line over
OECD90%; government revenue quickly increased to 11.7 trillion yuan in 2012
from 3 trillion in 2005, but fiscal is still deficit year after year and
planted a serious debt risks . The drawbacks of this investment and
financing system perhaps China
should reflect on the place.
Questioned Europe and the United States trade protectionism among the most Chinese people would like to see, and the 1930 ultra-high tariffs led to the outbreak of World War II as an example criticized European and American practice dangerous and immoral, and Europe 700 Yu Jiaguang volt sales enterprise opposition based on its policy lobbying power of the enemy can not be more than 25 photovoltaic manufacturing industry alliance, the comprehensive trade protection can not happen, but the local industry policy adjustments shift the inevitable.
The rise in the European Photovoltaic Panels industry financial subsidies the Chinese PV companies can not continue to hope
Of course, long-term domestic energy policy constraints restricting the Chinese PV companies to expand the domestic market. Pattern of Guodian conventional electricity monopoly long-term constraints on the photovoltaic industry policy attitudes in recent years just changing industrial electricity significantly higher than the civilian electricity will be more conducive to the prosperity of the Chinese PV companies ushered in distributed generation policies. In recent years, due to the rapid decline of the cost of polysilicon, the cost of solar cell power in
The financial structure of the high debt ratio is the reason many Chinese PV companies to defeat. The beginning of this century, 10 years of prosperity, the Chinese PV companies commonly used in the liability structure of the highly leveraged expansion, the photovoltaic industry long investment cycle, low return on investment (approximately 10-20%), "two out" the status of the Chinese PVdifficult for enterprises to effectively withstand the adjustment of the economic cycle.
In fact, the photovoltaic industry is not a special case of the Chinese model of economic development, but rather on behalf of the general growth of the Chinese economy. Industrial development deficiencies of its own capital accumulation can only continue to rely on external financing to meet its investment and market expansion, and subsequent investments can not follow up immediately into serious cash flow risk.
2008-2012,
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